

THIRTY FIVE CENTS

JUNE, 1955

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

WHY SOCIALISM?

ALBERT EINSTEIN

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

THE EDITORS

JAPAN AND CHINA

MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT

VOL. 7

2

U.S.A. 1955—A Report

LEO HUBERMAN

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly and copyright, 1955, by Monthly Review, Inc.

EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICE: 218 West 10th Street, New York 14, New York. Telephone: ORagon 5-6939.

MAILING ADDRESS: 66 Barrow Street, New York 14, New York. Address ALL communications to 66 Barrow Street.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—\$3.00 (foreign, \$3.50); two years—\$5.00 (foreign, \$6.00). By 1st class mail — United States \$5; everywhere else \$6.

By air mail — No. America \$7; So. America \$13; Europe \$17; Asia \$24.

EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

MR celebrated its sixth birthday at a party in New York given by MR Associates on May 16th. Professor Henry Pratt Fairchild, Chairman of the Associates, was both in the chair and in good form. Speakers, in addition to the editors, were Professor H. H. Wilson of Princeton, and Frank Wilkinson of Los Angeles, director of the Committee To Defend American Freedoms, which is the highly successful West Coast equivalent of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in New York. Well over two hundred people crowded into the Heywood Broun Room in the New York headquarters of the Newspaper Guild, and seemed to enjoy the occasion almost as much as we did.

It sometimes seems to us little short of a miracle that MR has been able to survive these six years of ever-intensifying repression. It has, though, thanks largely to your unfailing support and encouragement. The big question

(continued on inside back cover)

A REVIEW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Everyone, except perhaps Senator Knowland, seems to agree that the international situation has taken a sharp turn for the better in recent weeks—and even the “Senator from Formosa” would hardly deny that there has been a change.

Tension in the Formosa strait has abated, and bilateral talks between Washington and Peking are expected. An Austrian peace treaty seems about to be concluded. Another Big Four meeting in Europe now seems to be only a matter of time. Compare this situation with that which prevailed only a few weeks ago when war in the Far East seemed a very real possibility and the change in the Soviet government, coinciding with renewed emphasis on heavy industry, strongly pointed toward a general hardening of Soviet policy.

What is the reason for this dramatic shift? What new element has entered the picture with such apparent force and suddenness?

Ask these questions of an average reader of the United States press and you will almost certainly be told that the reason is a major backdown by Peking in the Far East and by Moscow in Europe. The Chinese reds, our hypothetical average newspaper reader will tell you, have stopped threatening to attack Formosa and, in order to conciliate non-Communist opinion at the Bandung Conference, offered to negotiate with the United States. And the Russians, having refused to sign an Austrian treaty for more than half a decade, suddenly reversed themselves and offered the Austrians more than they had expected or even asked for. And if our friend is pressed for an explanation of these alleged shifts in Chinese and Soviet policies, he will probably tell you that the Communists are at last reacting realistically to the growing strength of the Western alliance.

All of which goes to show how systematically the average American newspaper reader is misinformed and misled. For the truth is that there has been no significant change in Soviet or Chinese policy in recent months, let alone a major backdown in the last few weeks.

With regard to China, the facts are so clear that, once they are pointed out, there can be little dispute. Here we need only quote from Thomas J. Hamilton's leading article in the May 8th *New York Times* Sunday “Review of the Week” section: “Of course, it [the Peking government] wants to get the United States into direct ne-

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gotiations—that was made clear at Geneva last summer, and was confirmed by Premier Chou En-lai in his talks with Mr. Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary General, in January.” Repeating the offer to negotiate directly with the United States, at Bandung, did not make it into a new or different offer.

It is not quite so easy to refute the argument that the Russians backed down in the case of Austria, but that is really only because some of the facts about last year's Big Four meeting at Berlin have been almost totally suppressed in this country. If one looks into the European press at the time of the Berlin Conference, one finds that it was general knowledge in conference circles that the Russians then made the Austrians the very same offer that is now being so widely interpreted as a Soviet backdown—and that it was none other than Mr. Dulles who intervened to prevent the Austrians from accepting! We quote from the account cabled by a special correspondent in Berlin to the London *New Statesman & Nation* (February 20, 1954, p. 211):

As for the Austrians, Herr Kornhuber, the Austrian delegation's Press Officer, telescoped ages of Viennese philosophy in his solemn verdict: “They could have solved the whole Austrian problem in an hour if only Molotov and Figl had sat alone together in the corner of a coffee house.”

Two days before the conference ended, Kornhuber's magic formula almost produced a miracle; but, according to reliable conference circles, any compromise on the Austrian Treaty was prevented by Dulles. Figl was entertained by Molotov—not in a coffee house but at the Soviet Embassy, with Gromyko, Malik and others at the luncheon table. More by innuendo than by putting cards on the table, the Russians are reported to have hinted they might withdraw their proposal that Allied troops should stay indefinitely in Austria, and that they might content themselves with the retention of these garrisons until 1955, in exchange for Austria's neutralization. As Herr Raab, the Austrian Chancellor, had already publicly declared that his country would never join in any military alliance a pledge of neutrality would merely affirm existing policy. Raab, it is true, wants to have Molotov's demand for a ban on Austria's membership in “a coalition” defined precisely, because he favors Austrian adherence to the European coal-steel pool. Nonetheless, a bargain on the withdrawal of troops in return for Austrian neutrality seemed a serious possibility when Mr. Dulles intervened. He is reported to have impressed on Figl that, tempting as the signature of an Austrian treaty might be, such a climax to the Berlin Conference would be a grave embarrassment to Dr. Adenauer and might threaten the chances of the passage of the E.D.C. treaty; for a last-minute success at the Conference would lead millions of Europeans to decide that one can “do business” with the Russians

after all. It would be only a short step to their adding: "So why push through E.D.C. and German rearmament and thereby slam the door against real easement of East-West tension?"

If this account is accurate—and we see no reason to doubt that it is—it appears that there has been as little change in Moscow's policy towards Austria as there has been in Peking's attitude regarding direct negotiation with the United States. What has changed in both cases seems pretty clearly to be not Communist policy but capitalist policy. And who backed down also seems clear: not China or the Soviet Union but the United States.

The question to which we must address ourselves, then, is why United States policy has changed in recent weeks. And we can go on from there to inquire how deep and how lasting the change is likely to turn out to be.

When the question is thus correctly posed, there can hardly be any doubt about the general nature of the answer: America's ironically named "positions of strength" throughout the world have been rapidly deteriorating, and by last winter some of the most crucial had reached the verge of collapse. In this situation, to use a military analogy, there were two possibilities: immediate attack or retreat to more defensible ground. What has actually happened in the last few months can be understood only in terms of the highly dynamic, complex, self-contradictory process through which the United States has groped towards a choice between these inescapable alternatives.

The "attack now" forces, under the strategically placed leadership of Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, and Senator Knowland, were quick to seize the initiative. They deliberately, and with great skill, fabricated a Formosa crisis out of the capture by Peking of a small and relatively unimportant island which formed one of the chain of offshore islands from which Chiang Kai-shek has long been harassing the mainland. This was not the first such island captured and it will assuredly not be the last, and the whole incident could have been allowed to pass without notice or fanfare. Instead, Messrs. Dulles, Radford, Knowland *et al* made it the occasion for staging the elaborately publicized evacuation of the Tachens, stampeding through Congress a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to launch a preventive war, and securing hasty Senate approval of the pending mutual assistance treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. They followed up these moves with a barrage of propaganda about the imminence of military action from the mainland, obviously intended to prepare the public for war and to put irresistible pressure on Eisenhower to cash the blank check which Congress had drawn to his order.

The ultimate weakness of this strategy was that it required the

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cooperation of Peking—and Peking wasn't interested in cooperating. For a variety of reasons, good, bad, and indifferent, the people of the United States want no part of war, and the intelligent politicians in both the Republican and the Democratic Parties know it. Americans will fight against aggression, or anything that can convincingly be depicted as aggression. But they are overwhelmingly opposed to taking the initiative in starting a war. Under these circumstances, Peking had only to sit tight and talk softly in order to insure not only that the Dulles-Radford-Knowland policy would fail but that it would actually backfire.

This is precisely what happened. Peking did sit tight and talk softly. The "attack now" group not only lost its gamble but succeeded in stirring up an emotional wave of anti-war sentiment such as the country has not known since the Indo-China crisis in the spring of 1954.

In the meanwhile, the "positions of strength" continued to deteriorate in both Asia and Europe. The Bandung Conference showed that in all of free Asia and Africa, the United States could count on the support of only a small band of heavily subsidized satellites, and even they had no use for Chiang Kai-shek or America's Formosa policy. Britain and France and Canada, usually such reliable allies, likewise made it clear that they had no stomach for adventures designed to restore Chiang to power in China. Probably never before in the history of international relations has a major power been so isolated as the United States in the Formosa issue.

In Europe, too, the tide was running in the same direction. The Soviet offer to Austria of a peace treaty in exchange for a promise of neutrality, rejected at the behest of Mr. Dulles a year ago, was snapped up this year—a contrast which in itself speaks volumes about the changed state of mind of the European peoples. What had until then seemed to be Washington's greatest diplomatic victory—the winning of French approval for German rearmament within the framework of NATO—was in serious danger of going sour. Mendès-France had ruined, at least temporarily, a very promising political career to secure this triumph for Washington; his successor, Edgar Faure, seemed to be less than eager to follow suit, and instead became an advocate of negotiations with Moscow before any German troops could possibly be ready to take the field. The Germans, for their part, seeing that the Austrians "could do business with the Russians," began to wonder in increasing numbers whether they couldn't, too; and—most unkindest cut of all—even Chancellor Adenauer seemed to be in no hurry to push through the necessary enabling legislation for the rearmament program, perhaps having decided, like M. Faure, that the part of political wisdom was to walk

cautiously and keep an eye out for what might turn out to be the main chance. Across the Channel in Britain, the Tories, faced with a general election which they suddenly realized they could lose, became angels of peace (as they had once before, in 1935, without either the angelic or the peaceful qualities outlasting election day, however).

This, then, was the situation facing the Eisenhower administration: Peking had refused to provide the *casus belli* which the war-now boys so desperately needed; as a result, their labors succeeded only in alarming the country and bringing pressure on Washington to pull in its horns. At the same time; the trend abroad was strongly against American policy and in favor of negotiations to ease tensions and bring about a settlement of outstanding East-West problems. Eisenhower and his advisers were now merely following the line of least resistance in backing down all along the line. As we have already remarked, there are situations in which retreat is the only alternative to attack.

It would be quite wrong, however, to interpret this retreat as more than a tactical maneuver. There are no signs that United States policy is being changed, or even re-thought, in any of its essentials. Quite the contrary.

We have often described this policy in MR, and there is no need for a lengthy review at this time. Suffice it to say that the guiding principle was worked out by or under the direction of Messrs. Truman and Acheson and has been adhered to with remarkable consistency by Eisenhower, despite Dulles' repeated attempts to swing the administration as a whole into the preventive war camp. (It is worth remembering that Truman and Acheson also had to struggle against a war-now faction with powerful representatives inside the administration, most dramatically in the MacArthur affair of 1951.) This guiding principle is simply to build up Germany and Japan as the spearheads of what it is hoped will ultimately be an irresistible anti-socialist coalition.

Recent events have not only brought no change in this respect; they have actually produced one of the most explicit and authoritative statements of the line of reasoning which has animated United States policy ever since the beginning of the cold war. All informed observers of the Washington scene agree that the most powerful voice in the formation of foreign policy is now that of Senator George, Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is the key to effective bipartisanship today in just the way that Senator Vandenberg was in 1946-1948, and President Eisenhower is reliably reported to be in close agreement with Senator George on all important foreign policy issues. On April 23rd, Senator George ad-

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dressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the subject of foreign policy. He called for negotiations with Peking, and this is what made the headlines. Hardly less important, but almost totally neglected by the newspapers, was his pronouncement on the future role of Germany and Japan. Here is the gist of what he said on the subject, taken from the text of the speech as reproduced in *U. S. News & World Report* for May 6:

I think it may now be said, since the Yalta papers have been published, that we made a great mistake in insisting upon the complete destruction of the great producing nation of Europe—Germany.

Then, after Japan came in and before the end of the war, we again insisted upon its destruction—the complete, utter destruction of a great producing nation. Thus we insisted on the destruction of the greatest producers in the world, outside of ourselves, unmindful of the fact that at the moment we were creating economic and political vacuums. . . .

At any rate . . . these two great powers were destroyed. We made a peace treaty with Japan, and Japan is now slowly coming back. We made but recently a treaty with West Germany under which sovereignty was restored to West Germany. . . .

Both Germany and Japan are moving back industrially and commercially, especially West Germany. . . .

The coming back of West Germany will not be immediate, but ultimately it will mean the organization of all Western Europe and the retreat of the Soviets back to their ancient boundaries, with possibly the exception of one satellite which cannot be defended by Western Europe [perhaps Roumania or Bulgaria?]. Ultimately and at no great distant date, with the return to strength of Japan, there will commence again the age-old struggle—for Northern Korea and the rich area of Manchuria. That struggle will be between what we now call the Chinese People's Republic and Japan. . . .

At any rate, many men and women in this audience tonight will see the day when our Russian friends will go back to their ancient borders and boundaries and when again there will be re-established a power group in the Far East that will give some stability to that area.

We must resist the temptation to speculate on the kind of "stability" Senator George envisages being "re-established" in the Far East under the aegis of a resurgent Japan, and we may reserve for a moment comment on the realism of the Senator's forecast. Here, the point to be emphasized is that Senator George is not expressing any new ideas: he is merely giving explicit and forceful formulation to the underlying premises of what has been United States policy almost since the day of Franklin D. Roosevelt's death.

A policy of this kind, unlike the war-now policy, can be pursued with considerable tactical flexibility. It is therefore not surprising that—as far as official circles in the United States are concerned—it was Senator George who first suggested the desirability of a new Big Four conference (on March 20th over a nation-wide television hookup), and, in the speech from which we quoted above, called for direct negotiations between Washington and Peking.

But it is quite clear that a policy based on Senator George's premises cannot promote, or even aim at, the settlement of any fundamental East-West issues. There are two main reasons for this: First, all these issues are directly or indirectly related to the future role of Germany and Japan. And second, Senator George's picture of these countries' becoming once again a menace to the security of the USSR and China is not one that leaves the slightest room for East-West agreement.

Unless, then, there is a real change in United States policy in the near future, which is most unlikely, it seems inevitable that the aim of American representatives in the forthcoming round of negotiations will be the double one of insuring failure and pinning the blame for the failure on the other fellow.

This does not mean that nothing will come of these new negotiations. It must not be forgotten that Dulles went to Geneva a year ago with the same objective, that is to say, to sabotage the negotiations and pin the blame for failure on "the Communists." But it was Dulles and not the negotiations that failed. While Dulles came home to sulk, Messrs. Eden, Mendès-France, Molotov, and Chou stayed on to conclude the historic Geneva agreement putting an end to the Indo-China war. A similar situation could arise again this year, and it is even possible that Mr. Dulles has learned the lesson of his Geneva failure and will be inclined to make genuine concessions next time rather than allow decisions to be taken behind his back and against his will.

Finally, we come to the longer-run outlook. How realistic is Senator George's (and doubtless most of the United States ruling class's) assessment of the overall international situation? And how much chance is there that a policy based on this assessment will succeed?

Time alone, of course, will provide the definitive answer to these questions. But those of us who have been trained, or have trained ourselves, to look at things historically, to see the past and the present and the future as a continuing process of change and development—those of us who think in these terms cannot but be amazed by what at first sight looks like the willful blindness of Senator George and those who think like him.

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Do they really believe that two world wars and thoroughgoing social revolutions in the largest country and in the most populous country of the world have had only temporary effects and that the international balance of forces is about to revert to the *status quo ante*?

Are they really ignorant of the facts of economic life in Europe? That by comparison to the Soviet Union, Germany (and this applies all the more, of course, to a truncated West Germany) is now a second-class economic power? That the Soviet Union's economic strength is now approximately equal to that of all Western Europe combined (including both West Germany and Great Britain)? That in terms of manpower and resource potentials the USSR and its Eastern European allies have far greater possibilities for further development than has Western Europe?

Don't they know that in Asia, China is already the dominant military power and that long before Japan can hope to re-establish its military strength China will have moved into first place economically as well? That in terms of potentials for the future there is simply no comparison between China with its more than half billion people and vast undeveloped resources, and Japan with less than one fifth the manpower and probably not one fiftieth the natural resources?

And if they are ignorant of all these underlying economic facts and trends, can't they nevertheless see the handwriting on the wall in the transformation of the German and Japanese national characters? Only recently the most bellicose and militaristic peoples in the world, the Germans and Japanese now rank high among the most pacific. Are Senator George and those who think like him really incapable of seeing in this one of those great historic changes such as have ever characterized the rise and fall of warlike nations (clearly exemplified, for example, in the transformation of France after the Napoleonic wars)? And as far as Japan is concerned, don't they realize that, far from wanting to recommence the struggle "for Northern Korea and the rich area of Manchuria," the Japanese are in fact being irresistibly attracted into economic and cultural partnership with their Chinese neighbors—a partnership with the deepest kind of roots in the history of the relations between the two countries?

On the face of it, there would seem to be only one answer to all these questions. The American ruling class is ignorant; it does not even see what is happening in the world; and, not seeing, it cannot possibly understand. And yet this answer is in contradiction with much that we know to be true. It is possible to give detailed and fully documented answers to all the foregoing questions on the basis of copious published materials available to everyone who is interested in keeping well informed. Much of this information is published in

newspapers which are widely read and carefully attended to. Consider, for example, the following passage by M. S. Handler, contained in a dispatch from Bonn which appeared in the *New York Times*' "Review of the Week" section of May 8th:

In 1914 and in 1941 the Germans thought they could settle a thousand-year rivalry with the Slav world by war. The second attempt put an end to the German national state instead of putting an end to the Slav world. The West Germans seem to have understood the lesson that the constellation of power in the world has changed in such a manner that they can no longer aspire to a dominant role.

This changed attitude toward themselves and their role in history is one of the foundations of the present German attitude toward the Soviet problem. The West Germans are well aware of their own strength but are also aware of their limitations. They know they are strong enough industrially to play the leading role in Western Europe, but they no longer believe they can master the Soviet Union by force of arms.

No one who has made a conscientious effort to understand what has been happening in Germany since 1945 can doubt that this is a sober and realistic description of a decisive change that has taken place in the German mentality. And yet it is quite impossible to reconcile it with Senator George's theory that the recovery of West Germany will result in "the retreat of the Soviets back to their ancient boundaries, with possibly the exception of one satellite which cannot be defended by Western Europe." This could come about only as a result of war and Soviet defeat. As Mr. Handler points out, the Germans have tried it before. The last thing they want is to try again.

It is doubtless true that the available sources of knowledge are more meager in relation to Japan than to Germany. And yet even here there is no excuse for the kind of ignorance which Senator George's speech seems to imply. There are many people in our universities and foundations, and on our newspapers too, who know what is happening in Japan; and if the anti-Chinese hysteria of the last few years has kept them from speaking out as freely as one could wish, it is still not possible to talk in terms of a blackout of the truth. Any one who doubts it has but to read the wise and penetrating article on Japanese attitudes toward China by Professor Mary Wright of Stanford University, which we reprint in this issue of MR, beginning on p. 67 below.

No, ignorance cannot be the explanation of American ruling-class blindness. The essential facts are in the public domain and are widely known. The trouble is that people who think like Senator George—and in this category we include the vast majority of experts as well as policymakers—don't know what to do with facts. They

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have no way of putting them together to make a total, intelligible picture; they are incapable of seeing the present as emerging from the past and turning into the future. The result is that when they attempt to generalize, they think ideologically, in the original sense that Marx and Engels gave to that term—in other words, they reproduce stereotypes concocted from their interests and wishes, and ignore or suppress or distort mere facts which happen to be contradictory or inconvenient.

Needless to say, policies built on such foundations are bound to fail in the long run. Germany and Japan will never again be powers of the first rank, and even their ruling classes know it. They will remain, as they now are, incapable of playing the role assigned to them in capitalist America's world-wide crusade against socialism, and for this reason they are certain sooner or later—and perhaps sooner rather than later—to repudiate that role. Then, but not until then, the United States will finally be faced with the inescapable need for a new policy, based on a reappraisal of the national interest and a more realistic picture of the world we live in. Until then, we shall go from crisis to crisis, each offering to our self-blinded leadership the unpalatable choice between war and further retreat from no-longer-tenable positions of weakness.

(May 14, 1955)

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

(With apologies to Ernest Crosby whose poem "The Pirate Flag" may be found on p. 13 of Liberty Poems, Boston, 1900, an assortment of subversive verse "made for the New England Anti-Imperialist League" and "inspired by the crisis of 1898-1900.")

I had an ugly dream last night,
For I was far away,
A-sailing on a ship of war
Just out of Quemoy Bay.
Alas! I chanced to glance aloft
And then stood back aghast
To see a jet-black pirate flag
A-flying from the mast.

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

And then around me fore and aft
Big guns began to roar,
And flames sprang up and soon enwrapped
A village on the shore.
I took my glass and through it saw
Women and children run,
While leathernecks on the foc'sle deck
Potted them one by one.

I turned and asked a sailor lad
Who stood at my side at ease,
What pirates we might chance to be
Plaguering these China Seas.
"Oh, we're not that," he quick replied,
"Don't ask like that again.
This is a ship of your Uncle Sam
And we are Radford's men."

"But how is that?" I had to learn more.
"Where are our stripes and stars?
And does that inky flag up there
Belong to honest tars?"
"To tell the truth, it's downright queer,"
Replied embarrassed Jack,
"But something in the climate here
Has turned Old Glory black.

"We wash her in the briny sea
And in the streams on land;
We scrub her with the best of soap
And rub her in the sand;
And all of Chiang's slave laundrymen
And all our laundry aides
Have tackled her, but still she looks
Black as the ace of spades.

"There's something in the climate here
That changes things around;
And what the reason of it is
We none of us has found.
And so I don't know what to say,
Or even what to think,
When some one asks me what has made
Old Glory black as ink."

The sailor stopped and looked at me.
"I think you're foreign-born,
For you'd not asked about the flag
If duties had you torn."
He turned upon his heel and left,
And the sky above us broke,
And all about things came apart
As with a start, I woke.

Mason Stone

WHY SOCIALISM?

BY ALBERT EINSTEIN

What Shakespeare has Mark Antony say of Brutus can surely be said with infinitely greater truth of Albert Einstein:

His life was gentle, and the elements
So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up
And say to all the world, "This was a man!"

His death impoverishes the human race, and those of us who, more than perhaps we knew, revered his example and relied on his wisdom and courage are the special losers.

MONTHLY REVIEW owes an extra debt of gratitude to Dr. Einstein. He wrote an article for our first number, in May 1949, and we know that many of our early subscribers came to us because they wanted to lend their support to an undertaking in which Dr. Einstein had showed so marked a degree of confidence. Now that he has gone, we can think of no more fitting tribute to him than to reprint this warm and vibrant declaration of faith in human potentiality, and in socialism as the necessary means to its realization. Those who have read this article before, once or twice or many times, will benefit from reading it again. Those who have never read it—and there must be many among the thousands of new subscribers of the last six years—have an unforgettable experience before them.

Albert Einstein was more than a great scientist and a great man. He saw the problems of the human race with a clear and steady eye; he held fast to the great rationalist tradition of faith in the efficacy of social action; he believed that the brotherhood of man is an attainable goal here on earth. In other words, he was also a great socialist, and we are confident that historians of the future will honor him as such. When that time comes, this article from Volume One, Number One of MONTHLY REVIEW will be generally recognized as the classic that it is.—THE EDITORS

Is it advisable for one who is not an expert on economic and social issues to express views on the subject of socialism? I believe for a number of reasons that it is.

Let us first consider the question from the point of view of scientific knowledge. It might appear that there are no essential methodological differences between astronomy and economics: scientists in both fields attempt to discover laws of general acceptability for a circumscribed group of phenomena in order to make the interconnection of these phenomena as clearly understandable as possible. But in reality such methodological differences do exist. The discovery of general laws in the field of economics is made difficult by the

circumstance that observed economic phenomena are often affected by many factors which are very hard to evaluate separately. In addition, the experience which has accumulated since the beginning of the so-called civilized period of human history has—as is well known—been largely influenced and limited by causes which are by no means exclusively economic in nature. For example, most of the major states of history owed their existence to conquest. The conquering peoples established themselves, legally and economically, as the privileged class of the conquered country. They seized for themselves a monopoly of the land ownership and appointed a priesthood from among their own ranks. The priests, in control of education, made the class division of society into a permanent institution and created a system of values by which the people were henceforth, to a large extent unconsciously, guided in their social behavior.

But historic tradition is, so to speak, of yesterday; nowhere have we really overcome what Thorstein Veblen called “the predatory phase” of human development. The observable economic facts belong to that phase and even such laws as we can derive from them are not applicable to other phases. Since the real purpose of socialism is precisely to overcome and advance beyond the predatory phase of human development, economic science in its present state can throw little light on the socialist society of the future.

Second, socialism is directed towards a social-ethical end. Science, however, cannot create ends and, even less, instill them in human beings; science, at most, can supply the means by which to attain certain ends. But the ends themselves are conceived by personalities with lofty ethical ideals and—if these ends are not stillborn, but vital and vigorous—are adopted and carried forward by those many human beings who, half unconsciously, determine the slow evolution of society.

For these reasons, we should be on our guard not to overestimate science and scientific methods when it is a question of human problems; and we should not assume that experts are the only ones who have a right to express themselves on questions affecting the organization of society.

Innumerable voices have been asserting for some time now that human society is passing through a crisis, that its stability has been gravely shattered. It is characteristic of such a situation that individuals feel indifferent or even hostile toward the group, small or large, to which they belong. In order to illustrate my meaning, let me record here a personal experience. I recently discussed with an intelligent and well-disposed man the threat of another war, which in my opinion would seriously endanger the existence of mankind, and I remarked that only a supra-national organization would offer

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protection from that danger. Thereupon my visitor, very calmly and coolly, said to me: "Why are you so deeply opposed to the disappearance of the human race?"

I am sure that as little as a century ago no one would have so lightly made a statement of this kind. It is the statement of a man who has striven in vain to attain an equilibrium within himself and has more or less lost hope of succeeding. It is the expression of a painful solitude and isolation from which so many people are suffering in these days. What is the cause? Is there a way out?

It is easy to raise such questions, but difficult to answer them with any degree of assurance. I must try, however, as best I can, although I am very conscious of the fact that our feelings and strivings are often contradictory and obscure and that they cannot be expressed in easy and simple formulas.

Man is, at one and the same time, a solitary being and a social being. As a solitary being, he attempts to protect his own existence and that of those who are closest to him, to satisfy his personal desires, and to develop his innate abilities. As a social being, he seeks to gain the recognition and affection of his fellow human beings, to share in their pleasures, to comfort them in their sorrows, and to improve their conditions of life. Only the existence of these varied, frequently conflicting, strivings accounts for the special character of a man, and their specific combination determines the extent to which an individual can achieve an inner equilibrium and can contribute to the well-being of society. It is quite possible that the relative strength of these two drives is, in the main, fixed by inheritance. But the personality that finally emerges is largely formed by the environment in which a man happens to find himself during his development, by the structure of the society in which he grows up, by the tradition of that society, and by its appraisal of particular types of behavior. The abstract concept "society" means to the individual human being the sum total of his direct and indirect relations to his contemporaries and to all the people of earlier generations. The individual is able to think, feel, strive, and work by himself; but he depends so much upon society—in his physical, intellectual, and emotional existence—that it is impossible to think of him, or to understand him, outside the framework of society. It is "society" which provides man with food, clothing, a home, the tools of work, language, the forms of thought, and most of the content of thought; his life is made possible through the labor and the accomplishments of the many millions past and present who are all hidden behind the small word "society."

It is evident, therefore, that the dependence of the individual upon society is a fact of nature which cannot be abolished—just as

in the case of ants and bees. However, while the whole life process of ants and bees is fixed down to the smallest detail by rigid, hereditary instincts, the social pattern and interrelationships of human beings are very variable and susceptible to change. Memory, the capacity to make new combinations, the gift of oral communication have made possible developments among human beings which are not dictated by biological necessities. Such developments manifest themselves in traditions, institutions, and organizations; in literature; in scientific and engineering accomplishments; in works of art. This explains how it happens that, in a certain sense, man can influence his life through his own conduct, and that in this process conscious thinking and wanting can play a part.

Man acquires at birth, through heredity, a biological constitution which we must consider fixed and unalterable, including the natural urges which are characteristic of the human species. In addition, during his lifetime, he acquires a cultural constitution which he adopts from society through communication and through many other types of influences. It is this cultural constitution which, with the passage of time, is subject to change and which determines to a very large extent the relationship between the individual and society. Modern anthropology has taught us, through comparative investigation of so-called primitive cultures, that the social behavior of human beings may differ greatly, depending upon prevailing cultural patterns and the types of organization which predominate in society. It is on this that those who are striving to improve the lot of man may ground their hopes: human beings are *not* condemned, because of their biological constitution, to annihilate each other or to be at the mercy of a cruel, self-inflicted fate.

If we ask ourselves how the structure of society and the cultural attitude of man should be changed in order to make human life as satisfying as possible, we should constantly be conscious of the fact that there are certain conditions which we are unable to modify. As mentioned before, the biological nature of man is, for all practical purposes, not subject to change. Furthermore, technological and demographic developments of the last few centuries have created conditions which are here to stay. In relatively densely settled populations with the goods which are indispensable to their continued existence, an extreme division of labor and a highly-centralized productive apparatus are absolutely necessary. The time—which, looking back, seems so idyllic—is gone forever when individuals or relatively small groups could be completely self-sufficient. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that mankind constitutes even now a planetary community of production and consumption.

I have now reached the point where I may indicate briefly what

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to me constitutes the essence of the crisis of our time. It concerns the relationship of the individual to society. The individual has become more conscious than ever of his dependence upon society. But he does not experience this dependence as a positive asset, as an organic tie, as a protective force, but rather as a threat to his natural rights, or even to his economic existence. Moreover, his position in society is such that the egotistical drives of his make-up are constantly being accentuated, while his social drives, which are by nature weaker, progressively deteriorate. All human beings, whatever their position in society, are suffering from this process of deterioration. Unknowingly prisoners of their own egotism, they feel insecure, lonely, and deprived of the naive, simple, and unsophisticated enjoyment of life. Man can find meaning in life, short and perilous as it is, only through devoting himself to society.

The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the real source of the evil. We see before us a huge community of producers the members of which are unceasingly striving to deprive each other of the fruits of their collective labor—not by force, but on the whole in faithful compliance with legally established rules. In this respect, it is important to realize that the means of production—that is to say, the entire productive capacity that is needed for producing consumer goods as well as additional capital goods—may legally be, and for the most part are, the private property of individuals.

For the sake of simplicity, in the discussion that follows I shall call "workers" all those who do not share in the ownership of the means of production—although this does not quite correspond to the customary use of the term. The owner of the means of production is in a position to purchase the labor power of the worker. By using the means of production, the worker produces new goods which become the property of the capitalist. The essential point about this process is the relation between what the worker produces and what he is paid, both measured in terms of real value. Insofar as the labor contract is "free," what the worker receives is determined not by the real value of the goods he produces, but by his minimum needs and by the capitalists' requirements for labor power in relation to the number of workers competing for jobs. It is important to understand that even in theory the payment of the worker is not determined by the value of his product.

Private capital tends to become concentrated in few hands, partly because of competition among the capitalists, and partly because technological development and the increasing division of labor encourage the formation of larger units of production at the expense of the smaller ones. The result of these developments is an oligarchy

of private capital the enormous power of which cannot be effectively checked even by a democratically organized political society. This is true since the members of legislative bodies are selected by political parties, largely financed or otherwise influenced by private capitalists who, for all practical purposes, separate the electorate from the legislature. The consequence is that the representatives of the people do not in fact sufficiently protect the interests of the underprivileged sections of the population. Moreover, under existing conditions, private capitalists inevitably control, directly or indirectly, the main sources of information (press, radio, education). It is thus extremely difficult, and indeed in most cases quite impossible, for the individual citizen to come to objective conclusions and to make intelligent use of his political rights.

The situation prevailing in an economy based on the private ownership of capital is thus characterized by two main principles: first, means of production (capital) are privately owned and the owners dispose of them as they see fit; second, the labor contract is free. Of course, there is no such thing as a *pure* capitalist society in this sense. In particular, it should be noted that the workers, through long and bitter political struggles, have succeeded in securing a somewhat improved form of the "free labor contract" for certain categories of workers. But taken as a whole, the present day economy does not differ much from "pure" capitalism.

Production is carried on for profit, not for use. There is no provision that all those able and willing to work will always be in a position to find employment; an "army of unemployed" almost always exists. The worker is constantly in fear of losing his job. Since unemployed and poorly paid workers do not provide a profitable market, the production of consumers' goods is restricted, and great hardship is the consequence. Technological progress frequently results in more unemployment rather than in an easing of the burden of work for all. The profit motive, in conjunction with competition among capitalists, is responsible for an instability in the accumulation and utilization of capital which leads to increasingly severe depressions. Unlimited competition leads to a huge waste of labor, and to that crippling of the social consciousness of individuals which I mentioned before.

This crippling of individuals I consider the worst evil of capitalism. Our whole educational system suffers from this evil. An exaggerated competitive attitude is inculcated into the student, who is trained to worship acquisitive success as a preparation for his future career.

I am convinced there is only *one* way to eliminate these grave evils, namely through the establishment of a socialist economy, ac-

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accompanied by an educational system which would be oriented toward social goals. In such an economy, the means of production are owned by society itself and are utilized in a planned fashion. A planned economy, which adjusts production to the needs of the community, would distribute the work to be done among all those able to work and would guarantee a livelihood to every man, woman, and child. The education of the individual, in addition to promoting his own innate abilities, would attempt to develop in him a sense of responsibility for his fellow men in place of the glorification of power and success in our present society.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that a planned economy is not yet socialism. A planned economy as such may be accompanied by the complete enslavement of the individual. The achievement of socialism requires the solution of some extremely difficult socio-political problems: how is it possible, in view of the far-reaching centralization of political and economic power, to prevent bureaucracy from becoming all-powerful and overweening? How can the rights of the individual be protected and therewith a democratic counterweight to the power of bureaucracy be assured?

Clarity about the aims and problems of socialism is of greatest significance in our age of transition. Since, under present circumstances, free and unhindered discussion of these problems has come under a powerful taboo, I consider the foundation of this magazine to be an important public service.

The fundamental idea upon which socialism rests is the same fundamental idea as that upon which all real scientific work is carried on. It is the denial that chance impulse and individual will and happening constitute the only possible methods by which things may be done in the world. It is an assertion that things are in their nature orderly; that things may be computed, may be calculated upon and foreseen.

—H. G. Wells, *Social Anticipations*

We are on the surface of a sun. Therefrom volcanoes and cyclones of fire rage forth red, tumultuous, and awful storms of flame. But these pass into space, a white light to kiss the stars into gardens of love and beauty.

—Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1890

U.S.A. 1955—A REPORT

BY LEO HUBERMAN

My report tonight is based on talks I have had with faculty and students of eight universities, and with people in various walks of life in 15 cities across the country. My point of reference is a similar tour, covering many of the same cities, which I made about 15 months ago.

Has there been a noticeable change since last year? Is the protest movement against the witch hunt growing? Are more Americans joining in the battle to defend our democratic freedoms?

These were the questions that were asked most frequently on my recent tour. I want to begin tonight by answering each of the questions in the affirmative: there is a noticeable change since last year; the protest movement is growing; more Americans are fighting back.

Part of the change is undoubtedly due to the setback suffered by Senator McCarthy a year ago. A social satirist in one of the night clubs in San Francisco sums up that situation neatly with this comment: "Not McCarthyism but McCarthywasm."

He then goes on to boast that the United States is not taking any guff from the countries behind the Iron Curtain. No, sir. Every time they're tough with us, we retaliate. How? Well, every time they lock up an American, we hit right back at them—we go right out and lock up another American.

You would not have heard this kind of satire in a public place anywhere in the country 15 months ago. And certainly the performer who ridiculed our policy in such a manner would have been black-listed immediately. But today the changed climate is indicated by the fact that one of the big television networks has just signed up this entertainer to do his lampooning on a national hookup.

The newspapers, too, give abundant proof that the drive against our civil and political liberties has lost much of its popularity. Thus, one of the featured writers of the Los Angeles *Mirror-News*, on April 18, 1955, devoted the major part of his column to an attack on two state legislators who had introduced bills in the California legislature, which called for the revocation of the license of professional persons

This is the text of an address delivered at the Birthday Party of Monthly Review on May 16, 1955, at the Heywood Brown Room of the American Newspaper Guild in New York City.

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refusing to answer questions concerning their political opinions and associations before any investigating committee. He characterized these two witch hunters as spokesmen for "the lunatic right-wing fringe," said that their "bills have all sorts of ridiculous implications," and then, citing the aroused opposition to the bills, he ended his attack with the joyful note that "it doesn't seem we're quite ready for the thought police."

The San Francisco *Chronicle* also came out strongly against these repressive measures in an editorial on March 29, 1955. It said: "Since both the Federal and State Constitutions allow witnesses under subpoena to refuse answers to questions they believe might incriminate them, the Burns and Chapel bills are themselves subversive of the Constitution."

In Denver where a Smith Act trial has been going on for several weeks, one of the newspapers has made it a policy not to print the names of any people, other than those on trial, who are mentioned in the course of the proceedings. I attended the trial one afternoon and was impressed with the fair handling given the story by both Denver newspapers. In general, in every one of the cities I visited, the editorials on the witch hunt are more sane than they were a year ago, and news stories are better both in respect to tone and the position they are given in the paper.

The headlines, too, mark the change, not yet so vividly, of course, as they did over 140 years ago, when Napoleon was marching across France on his return from Elba. From March 9 to March 22, 1815, the Paris newspapers faithfully reported Napoleon's progress as follows (I quote from *The Nation* of August 8th, 1934):

March 9

THE ANTHROPOPHAGUS HAS QUITTED HIS DEN

March 10

THE CORSICAN OGRE HAS LANDED AT CAPE JUAN

March 11

THE TIGER HAS ARRIVED AT CAP

March 12

THE MONSTER SLEPT AT GRENOBLE

March 13

THE TYRANT HAS PASSED THROUGH LYONS

March 14

THE USURPER IS DIRECTING HIS STEPS TOWARD DIJON

March 18

BONAPARTE IS ONLY SIXTY LEAGUES FROM THE CAPITAL

He has been fortunate enough to escape his pursuers

March 19

BONAPARTE IS ADVANCING WITH RAPID STEPS,
BUT HE WILL NEVER ENTER PARIS

March 20

NAPOLEON WILL, TOMORROW, BE UNDER OUR RAMPARTS

March 21

THE EMPEROR IS AT FONTAINEBLEAU

March 22

HIS IMPERIAL AND ROYAL MAJESTY

arrived yesterday evening at the Tuileries, amid the joyful acclamations
of his devoted and faithful subjects.

One of the best signs of the developing reaction to the attack on our freedoms, in the name of "security," was the militant opposition to the Burns and Chapel bills in California. That progressives would be opposed to these measures and would fight hard against them was to be expected; much more significant was the fight put up by the most respected, and most conservative, leaders of the State Medical Society and the Bar Association.

Only a few months before the bills were to be acted on, the State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct recommended that the State Bar itself sponsor legislation which included provisions identical in all respects with the Chapel and Burns bills. Fortunately, before acting on this recommendation, the Board of Governors solicited the views of practicing lawyers. It learned that the opponents of such legislation outnumbered those in favor by four to one. Whereupon, the Board of Governors voted to oppose the Burns and Chapel bills, and to disapprove the recommendation for similar legislation which had been previously submitted by its own committee.

The campaign against the bills was successful. So great was the opposition, so large the delegation of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals to the State Capitol, that the bills were killed in committee.

Perhaps the most heartening of recent events which show the turning of the tide was the great victory for academic freedom which was won at the University of Washington. This was especially significant because the University of Washington was one of the first in the country to be corrupted by fear; it was one of the earliest to lend itself to the witch hunt by firing professors for their political views. The protest movement in 1949-1950 was not big enough to prevent the dismissal of Professors Herbert Phillips, Joseph Butterworth, and Ralph Gundlach. But just a few months ago the protest movement *was* big enough to force the President of the University to issue a public statement assuring the faculty that he was taking steps to set up machinery for their full participation in the discussion of University policies; and the protest movement was big enough for the

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Faculty Senate to state publicly that it "regrets the damage done to the University by the decision in the Oppenheimer case."

That decision—refusal to permit Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer to lecture at the University—had been made by President Henry Schmitz. A few years ago, he might have gotten away with it, but not in March 1955. As soon as his decision was announced, seven eminent scientists scheduled to participate in a conference at the University signed a round-robin letter to President Schmitz, telling him they would not attend the conference. "It seems to us," they wrote, "that you have clearly placed the University of Washington outside the community of scholars."

This academic boycott was immediately supported by other scholars, and two important scientific meetings which were to be held at the University had to be called off. Great concern was felt by everyone connected with the University at the "black eye" it had received in the academic world.

The student body protested the President's action; so did many of the faculty. Finally, on April 7, the University of Washington Senate, an advisory group of 100 faculty members, voted 56-40 against the action of the President. So keenly did the University feel the boycott that the Senate ended its statement announcing its vote, with this plea to scholars: "We earnestly hope that our colleagues from other institutions will again feel free to join us from time to time for scholarly discussions on the campus."

Seven scientists took a principled stand, and students and faculty rallied around them until they won a smashing victory. How clearly this incident proves that reaction *can* be defeated—where brave men are willing to stand up and fight! When will the social scientists learn the lesson of courage and solidarity which the natural scientists, more than any other academic group, seem to have been demonstrating in recent years?

At approximately the same time that this fight was going on at the University of Washington, students on other campuses were also meeting attacks on their freedom. At the University of Wisconsin, the Student Council came out strongly against two bills introduced in the State Assembly at the request of the American Legion. One called for the creation of a State Committee to investigate "subversion"; the other would deny the use of public buildings to individuals or groups cited as "subversive." In its objections to the bills, the Student Council said in part: "We question whether any committee or legislative body should be given the power to define Americanism. . . . Investigation into the extent of subversive teaching in Wisconsin's public schools would involve investigation into the private beliefs and opinions of Wisconsin's teachers. Such an investigation would violate the

principle . . . that the competence and integrity of an educator can be determined only by his peers."

In California, an all-State Student Civil Liberties Conference was called for April 23-24. After detailing the many instances of the suppression of freedom in the colleges of California leading to the students becoming "The Silenced Generation," the Conference Call asks the question "Who Is To Blame?" It gives this answer to the question:

Every professor who values his job more than academic freedom is guilty. Every student who cares more for his future security than for his rights as an American citizen—he too is guilty. *Freedom isn't free.* There is a price for freedom and that price is our willingness to face hardship and sacrifice. Our history is a proud record of those who paid that price. Some died in battle, some went to prison for their beliefs. Because of them we are free today. But freedom is the kind of thing we never finish paying for. The big question today is whether the American people are willing to keep up the payments. And the American people include us—the students.

One factor making for a change in the climate is the growing realization by many who were not aware before, of the shabby, collusive tactics employed by the Department of Justice in the persecution of left-wingers. The Matusow confessions, and now the current Dave Brown recantation, are shaking the faith of fair-minded people in American justice as it is practiced today, particularly in trials of members of the Communist Party. In my afternoon at the Smith Act trial in Denver, I saw plain evidence of frame-up procedure.

On the stand was Warren L. Fortson, a steelworker who for nearly six years had been an undercover agent for the FBI in the Communist Party. He was asked if he recalled his testimony of a few days ago in which he had said that he had attended a Communist Party meeting at the home of one of the defendants in which the statement was made that "the people could protect themselves against terrific odds by taking up arms and using force."

The witness recalled his testimony to that effect.

Then he was handed the report of that meeting which he had sent to the FBI at the time it was held; he was asked to find in it the specific passage, or anything like it, which was in his sworn testimony. He could not do so. The report was read in the courtroom. There was no such passage.

Then his testimony concerning another meeting was read to him in which he had said the statement was made that the "Communist Party was going to supply leadership to the Negro people, and after educating them liberate them by revolution."

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Again he agreed that that had been his testimony. And again the FBI report was read in the courtroom—and there was nothing in it that corresponded to his testimony.

So it went with four other excerpts from the testimony, all of them allegedly quoting statements in which the words "violent revolution," "force," "violence and revolution" had been used. Always these key words, so vital for the prosecution to pin on the defense in a Smith Act trial, were found in the *testimony* of the witness but never in the *FBI reports which he had written at the time of the meetings*.

No unprejudiced person could have been present in that courtroom without coming away with the firm conviction that the role his government was playing in this particular judicial proceeding was, to say the least, infamous.

The fact is that while McCarthyism is less of a threat than it was a year ago, Brownellism has taken its place. While it is true that the resistance to the witch hunt grows, it is also true that the repression continues. Courage is contagious—but so is fear. And fear still stalks the land.

The FBI is, perhaps, even more active than before in seeking out and intimidating people, and trying to convert us into a nation of informers. The Immigration Department continues its relentless drive against aliens.

Congressional Committee members, while better-mannered than they were before, continue as in the past to use the inquisition as a step-ladder to political success. In Seattle, where the Un-American Activities Committee was given hundreds of names by a stool-pigeon named Barbara Hartle, many people are faced with slow economic death. There if you are called before a Committee and you take the Fifth, your *union* expels you. I talked with one man who had been a member of the Machinists Union for 25 years, who was named and expelled and now finds it difficult to support his family because of expulsion by his union.

On the waterfront, the "screening" procedure makes it impossible for a seaman or dock worker who once gave a dollar to Spain, to secure the necessary Coast Guard papers to enable him to make a living at his trade.

On the campuses everywhere, progressive students are frequently discouraged because of the lack of interest in serious problems, the maddening apathy of most of the student body. I asked a friend who teaches at a great university whether the professors were afraid to teach what they knew to be true. He said that fear does not exist among his colleagues, because fear denotes the tension that arises when you feel you can't express in the classroom the opinions you

express to your wife in the privacy of your home; but this tension doesn't exist on the campus because most teachers in our universities today have no hidden thoughts. They have nothing to say at home that differs from what they say in class.

And books are still being thrown out of some school libraries. A few days before I arrived in Los Angeles, my own history of the United States, *We, The People*, was ordered off the shelves in a junior high school there. My book was one of 14 that had been removed by order of the higher-ups in the school system of Los Angeles. When *We, The People* was first published in 1932, it was selected by a booksellers' committee as one of 200 books presented to President Roosevelt for the permanent library in the White House. It is well that the Los Angeles school authorities are not aware of that fact, else they might call for a book-burning on the White House lawn.

Setbacks and advances always run concurrently in a period of crisis. The important difference this year over last is that there is a change, that there are more people who are unwilling to accept the yoke of conformity, that there is an ever-increasing awareness of the danger of the imposition of tyranny if we allow ourselves to be silenced.

I had dinner with a young scientist and his wife at one of the universities I visited. He said they were new to the community, and felt a bit isolated; did I, by chance, know any progressive students whom he and his wife could meet?

I told him I did know a few serious young people who were interested in world affairs, and I could easily bring them all together. "But," I warned him, "you understand that this will be dangerous, particularly for you, because of your work."

He reflected a moment, then said quietly, "Not to be able to see the people one wants to see, not to be able to do what one feels must be done, is to die."

This was not mock heroics. It was a simple statement of a devout belief. And only when many more Americans believe it too—and act on it—will we finally succeed in making the change from fear to freedom.

We should not forget that our tradition is one of protest and revolt, and it is stultifying to celebrate the rebels of the past—Jefferson and Paine, Emerson and Thoreau—while we silence the rebels of the present.

—Henry Steele Commager, *Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent*

COSTA RICA: CITADEL OF DEMOCRACY

BY ELENA DE LA SOUCHERE

Mlle. de la Souchère, who is now on the staff of the Paris weekly *France-Observateur*, is a frequent contributor to MR on Latin American subjects. The timeliness of her article on Costa Rica is not to be measured by the role of that country in today's headlines (we are writing these lines in the first week of May). Beneath the surface, Costa Rica remains the nerve center of a steadily mounting Central American crisis. We have what we believe to be reliable information that a new invasion of Costa Rica is even now being planned and, in the absence of outside intervention, will certainly take place. Mlle. de la Souchère's article shows why Costa Rica is the object of attack and highlights the responsibility of the State Department in the present situation.—THE EDITORS

Costa Rica is unique among the Latin American countries. Next to smallest in size (exceeding only El Salvador) and in population (larger than Panama alone), Costa Rica is nevertheless the Latin American country which has been most in the news during the past six months or so. Victim of an aggressive attack similar to that which overthrew the progressive government of Guatemala, Costa Rica succeeded in repulsing the invaders, thanks to the support of the Organization of American States and to the backing of democratic and labor opinion in the United States.

Nevertheless, it is by no means certain that the danger of invasion is past. Costa Rica is relatively isolated in the violent and variegated Caribbean area. The only country with a predominantly white population, it is surrounded by countries in which Indians constitute the majority. And it is the only genuinely democratic state in a universe where dictatorship is the normal form of government. While the neighboring countries are subjected to the rule of turbulent military castes, Costa Rica lacks even a standing army; and the proportion of its budget going to public education is larger than that devoted to military ends. And finally, though President Figueres' regime is militantly anti-Communist, it nevertheless is the most advanced on the continent from the social standpoint, the only one that has nationalized the country's banking system.

The Adopted Land of Christopher Columbus

Costa Rica's distinctive characteristics have their origin in geography and history. The country was discovered in 1502 by Christopher

Columbus, the early European arrivals confining their attention to the Atlantic coast where they soon found a few nuggets of gold in the waters of the Veragua River. This gave rise to the legend of fabulous riches from which the name of Costa Rica (rich coast) was derived. The illusion was so deeply implanted in Columbus' mind that on his return to Spain he asked to be granted as recompense for his services the Land of the Veragua, which was the name then given to a strip of Atlantic coast line that extends into the territories of present-day Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. And in fact, after a long contest which Columbus himself did not survive, the title of Duke of Veragua was conferred on Columbus' small son and is still held by one of his descendants. It soon became purely honorary, one of the explorer's early descendants exchanging his fief for a pension, and the territory which now constitutes the Republic of Costa Rica later passing directly under the administration of the Spanish crown.

The Athens of the Tropics

It was subsequently discovered that the surface deposits which filled Columbus' companions with wonder yielded only a few nuggets, and that the misnamed "rich coast" was only a narrow fringe bounded by the Atlantic on one side and by steep heights on the other. Most of the country is made up of high plateaus, ranging in altitude from about 4,000 to over 5,000 feet. On the west side there is again a sharp drop, leaving only a narrow strip between the foot of the escarpment and the Pacific.

The Costa Rican uplands were destined to become the end of the road for the Spanish pioneers. The *conquistadores* who arrived early or were lucky acquired vast estates in nearby countries, or along the coasts, where a lavish nature produced abundance without effort and where the mass of Indians provided plenty of cheap labor. But the poor immigrants who came late in search of land had to betake themselves to the plateaus of Costa Rica. From the north of Spain, mostly Galicians and Basques, they found in their new surroundings conditions not unlike those they knew in their homeland. While the Europeans in the low tropical regions mixed with the natives and grew soft as a result of the humid heat and a too-easy opulence, the men of the high plateaus retained their original characteristics and virtues. Poor and numerous, they had to content themselves with small parcels of land which successive generations have still further subdivided. Servile labor was rare, and the colonists had to wrest their livelihood from soil less productive than that of the coasts below.

The upshot is that today the Costa Rican plateau is a region of small and medium property, peopled to the extent of 90 percent by the descendants of the original Spanish settlers. This ethnic com-

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position of the country has had important political consequences. Even the poorest of the early colonists had received some rudiments of education, and they wanted their children to benefit from the same advantages. As a result, the cultural level of Costa Rica has always been above that of the neighboring countries, and public education has been the object of special care on the part of the government. In other Central American countries, composed mostly of an illiterate mass of Indians, citizenship has been the privilege of the few; in Costa Rica, on the other hand, most of the inhabitants are citizens. From this fact, public opinion naturally developed as the arbiter among factions and personalities, and voting became the normal mode of settling conflicts. To be sure, political life has been tumultuous, after the Spanish fashion, but putsches and civil wars have been rarer than in the rest of Central America, constituting brief interruptions in an essentially democratic continuity. By contrast, in the countries with greater inequality and lacking anything that can be called public opinion, the quarrels of the oligarchs could be settled only by force, and dictatorship became the normal mode of government. Thus Professor Arévalo, who was to become the founder of Guatemala's subsequent democratic regime, could write, in October 1937, to the Rector of the University of San Jose:

I consider Costa Rica to be the unique standard-bearer of our great fatherland, the only one that has preserved culture, civic decency, public respect, democratic honesty. These are values which have been destroyed, corrupted, or rejected in the other parts of a country which was great and shall be great again.

The "great fatherland" to which Arévalo referred was "Isthmia," the federation of the six small republics of Central America which had once been united in a single Spanish administrative district, the captainry of Guatemala.

Bananas, Disorders, and Liberation

Costa Rica presents similarities to, as well as differences from, the other republics of Central America: the tropical abundance of the low coastal zones and the backwardness of a purely agricultural economy. Moreover, the cultural level, though above that of its neighbors, is sensibly lower than in most Western countries. These circumstances favored the economic penetration of Costa Rica by big North American corporations.

Indeed it was Costa Ricans, sincerely anxious to foster the development of their country in some cases, bribed in others, who were the first to grant a railroad concession to United States capitalists. This railroad was intended to transport bananas, and it was not long before it merged with United Fruit. There soon followed large land

concessions to the great Boston fruit trust.

Thus it came to pass that the Costa Rican economy is today characterized by two systems, the one superimposed on the other, corresponding roughly to two geographical zones. The first zone, which includes not only the high plateaus but also the Pacific littoral, is in the hands of Costa Rican nationals. Here the distribution of property is far from equal, but the great estate is almost unknown. In the uplands, the main crops are cereals; the Pacific coast, which opens up to the north to form the province of Puntarenas, is an abundant producer of cocoa (4,000 tons), sugar (200,000 tons), and coffee (21,000 tons). First among Central American countries as a producer of cocoa, Costa Rica ranks fourth (behind Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama) in sugar cane, and third (after El Salvador and Guatemala) in coffee.

The second zone, the Atlantic coast, is the empire of the banana. It is dominated by very large estates belonging to United Fruit. As a producer of bananas, Costa Rica, with an annual output of some 220,000 tons, ranks second only to Honduras (370,000 tons) among the Central American countries.

The existence of vast foreign-owned banana plantations has put a brake on the economic development of the country, and this in two ways. First, by the concentration of large areas in the hands of a single owner. True, United Fruit's workers are generally better paid than others, but they are permanently deprived of any possibility of acquiring land of their own, a disability which increases in importance with the rapid growth of population. Second, because much of the net produce of the banana plantations simply disappears from the Costa Rican economy in the form of dividends to foreign stockholders. The result is that Costa Rica is precluded from importing, in exchange for her own products, consumers goods to raise the Costa Rican standard of living, and capital goods to establish a more productive industry for the future.

Costa Rica's economic sickness led eventually, during World War II, to a serious political crisis which in turn favored the rise to power of a minority imbued with Nazi ideas, at the time all-too-popular in certain Latin American circles. This group, whose "strong man" was Calderon Guardia, placed Teodoro Picado at the head of the government. At the same time, Communism was making headway among the *mariachis*, the half-starved peons of the banana region. Following a policy of the greater evil (*politique du pire*) in order to foster their propaganda campaign based on the misery of the masses, the local Communist leaders allied themselves with the neo-falangist dictatorship. Careerism and black-marketing reigned supreme in the capital, while bands of *mariachis* prowled the countryside terrorizing land-

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lords and holding travelers up to ransom.

All these excesses provoked a strong popular reaction. Otilio Ulate, 1948 conservative candidate for the presidency, supported by the prosperous landlords and the middle classes, was elected by a large majority. But the group in power refused to accept the election results and proceeded to assassinate Dr. Valverde, Ulate's closest collaborator. Deprived of all legal means of expression, the peasants, opposing violence to violence, rose up in arms to reinstate the parliamentary regime. Their leader was a young landlord, descendant of Catalan colonists, Jose Figueres. Of small stature, precise mind, and ready tongue, "Don Pepe" typifies the educated middle proprietor. Starting with a small band of disciples, including tenants on his own land, Figueres' army of liberation attracted new volunteers as it swept through village after village. After six weeks of hard fighting, the "liberation volunteers," clad in work clothes and armed with hunting pieces, entered San Jose, the capital of the country.

A period of seventeen months of *de facto* Figueres government prepared the way for the restoration of the constitutional regime and the assumption of the presidency by the elected candidate, Otilio Ulate. At the end of the latter's regular term in 1953, Figueres himself was elected President of the Republic.

War Against the Right and the Left

The policy of Figueres displays all the characteristics of Latin American nationalistic reformism: the tendency to base political power on a strongly encouraged trade-union movement; economic planning aimed to increase production and raise living standards; the striving for economic independence with a view to recapturing the proportion of the national product going to foreign stockholders. As for actual accomplishments, Figueres outstripped all the other Latin American governments when, on June 21, 1948, he decreed the nationalization of the banks.

Politically, the nationalist-reformism of Costa Rica took a solidly parliamentary form, militantly opposed to both Calderonian conservatism and Communism. The position was clearly shown to the world on the occasion of the convening of the Caracas Conference of the Organization of American states in April 1954. Alone among the American states, Costa Rica refused to attend a conference held under the auspices of the bloody Venezuelan dictatorship. In "the global war," stated the Costa Rican communique, "we shall be with the West, with democracy, with the American hemisphere, by the side of the United States to which the leadership in this conflict would return." But in the same communique, Figueres denounced the military coups which had overthrown one after another of the demo-

cratic governments of the Latin American world:

The peoples are in effect asked to suffer their oppressors patiently and not to lose their faith in democracy. . . . But we are convinced that the peoples will not tolerate that, in the name of an abstract and far-off "world freedom," the examination of their immediate problem should be indefinitely postponed. This problem is that of their own freedom. How could the peoples lose rights which they never enjoyed?

This democratic intransigence put Costa Rica in a dangerous position by drawing upon it the anger of the dictators of the Caribbean area; but at the same time, it was Costa Rica's salvation in that it assured to that little country the sympathies of democratic opinion and of the labor movement both in the United States and throughout Latin America.

Aggression

The struggle between Figueres and his neighbor, President Somoza of Nicaragua, has often been described as a personal quarrel. Actually, it is the opposition of two political systems. Caribbean dictatorships rest on the support of oligarchies whose privileges they defend against the demands of the masses. They claim to be the guarantee of public order against the chaos which would allegedly follow the restoration of popular liberties. To the extent that it reconciled order, liberty, and social progress, the Figueres regime destroyed this legend. Its example thereby encouraged the proletarian masses and became at once a stimulus to the liberal opposition and a danger to the dictators.

From 1948 on, Costa Rica and Nicaragua each gave asylum to the opponents of the other's regime, and a bitter struggle developed between the two little states which finally took an acute turn in the spring of 1954. This sudden aggravation of an old quarrel came immediately after Costa Rica had imposed new terms on United Fruit.

One of Figueres' basic objectives was to limit the portion of the national product exported in the form of dividends. There were two possible methods: that of partial or total nationalization, as practiced by Paz Estensoro in Bolivia and Arbenz in Guatemala, and that of taxing the profits of foreign companies. Figueres chose the second as most likely to achieve his immediate aim without provoking too strong a hostile reaction. By an accord signed in June 1954, United Fruit undertook to turn over to the Costa Rican government, under various headings, an amount totalling 42 percent of its receipts from the sale of Costa Rican products. It also agreed to raise the pay of its employees and to buy locally various commodities which it had been importing from the United States. All in all, the burden imposed on United Fruit was of the order of 60 million colonos, or approxi-

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mately \$20 million.

The conversations between the Figueres government and the company began in late April, and the Costa Rican demands were doubtless known to the company somewhat earlier. In the course of this same month of April, Somoza massed forces on the Costa Rican border, giving as a pretext the support which Figueres had allegedly lent to a conspiracy against the Nicaraguan regime. It was undoubtedly true that Nicaraguan refugees had secretly returned to their own country from Costa Rica to take part in the plot. Arrested, they were tortured into implicating Figueres. On the basis of these confessions, the Nicaraguan government addressed a threatening note to San Jose.

The period of operations against Guatemala was marked by relative calm on the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican frontier. But once victorious over Arbenz, the mercenary forces which Somoza had placed at the disposal of Castillo Armas awaited only the signal to march against Figueres and made no attempt to hide the nature of their next mission.

The attack was postponed, doubtless in the first instance to allow time for the international reaction against the invasion of Guatemala to die down. Then came the rainy season which rendered military operations impractical. The Costa Rican government, aware of the presence on its borders of hostile mercenary forces, foresaw that the attack would come in January. The event confirmed the forecast.

Thus in the case of Costa Rica, as in that of Guatemala, aggression followed closely on the adoption of measures contrary to the interests of United Fruit. The troops involved were the same. In both cases, they took off from the same base, Nicaragua. And in both cases the son of President Somoza, the young colonel "Tachito," performed the functions of organizer of the invasion, secret commander-in-chief, and intermediary in the purchase of arms.

Aggression Repulsed

Nevertheless, the situation in Costa Rica was very different from that in Guatemala six months earlier. Costa Rica had no regular army and counted for its defense on an improvised popular militia. This arrangement, though not without serious military drawbacks, at least excluded the possibility of betrayal by a military caste. Moreover, the Costa Rican population, unlike the largely Indian and traditionally passive Guatemalans, responded enthusiastically to the government's call to arms.

Internationally, too, there were differences. Arbenz's toleration of the Communists had divided democratic opinion and paralyzed support which otherwise would have been forthcoming from the United States and Latin America. In contrast, the Costa Rican government,

at once progressive and anti-Communist, had rallied around it the unanimous support of all the democratic elements of the hemisphere, including the AFL and the CIO in the United States. Since it was above suspicion of playing ball with the Communists, the Costa Rican government could count on a fair hearing for any complaint against aggression which it might lodge with the Organization of American States.

It was within this national and international setting that the attack on Costa Rica unfolded. There is no space for the details of diplomatic and military maneuvering. Suffice it to say that Figueres, by a well-timed appeal to the Organization of American States, succeeded in forcing the hands of his opponents before they were fully prepared for action. The invaders were obliged to gamble on a military strategy of capturing airfields well within Costa Rica and disguising the whole affair as an internal uprising *before* the commission sent out by the OAS could arrive on the scene. This strategy failed completely, and Somoza, not daring to throw his regular army into the struggle, was obliged to abandon his mercenaries to a hazardous retreat.

We should not forget, however, that even the most skillful diplomatic maneuvering would have been in vain if it had not been for the courage of the Costa Rican volunteers who responded in their thousands to the government's call to arms. "There were a thousand men for each rifle," said Don Pepe in his radio speech of January 15th. "For every meal needed, there were twenty cooks; for every typewriter, a hundred girls." The message also underlined the flood of offers of other kinds of assistance: houses, automobiles, trucks, food for the fighting men. To an appeal for blood donors, a long line formed outside the San Jose hospital: the radio had to beg the volunteers to wait for a new appeal.

The Threat Remains

Hostilities had hardly come to an end before new acts of violence occurred to alarm the frontier region and to confirm the threat which, according to a *New York Times* reporter, "Tacho" Somoza is supposed to have addressed to members of the OAS commission of inquiry on their visit to Managua: "If necessary, I can prolong the guerrilla war for ten years."

Otilio Ulate and his associates are conspiring inside Costa Rica. Prevented by Figueres from putting through a constitutional amendment which would have allowed him to serve more than one term as president, Ulate has never forgiven the man who installed him in power in 1949. All evidence indicates that if the invasion from Nicaragua had succeeded, Ulate would have emerged from the shadows

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to resume the position of head of state. Two deputies close to Ulate are even now being prosecuted on the basis of documents seized after the attempted invasion—documents which prove that they had accepted appointment to the provisional junta which was supposed to replace Figueres. Ulate himself, however, was never arrested, since no documents directly implicating him were discovered, and since constitutional guarantees of individual liberties, suspended during the actual fighting, were restored a few weeks later. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of public mourning and indignation called forth by the useless killing, the attitude of Ulate, widely publicized by his own newspapers and radio station, provoked a strong reaction which reached its height when the ex-president, on his way to Guatemala, stopped off to visit with the Nicaraguan chief. The word "treason" went from mouth to mouth, and certain of Ulate's lieutenants thought it wise to dissociate themselves from their boss.

The Costa Rican government is now attempting to get from the Organization of American States a declaration that Nicaragua was the aggressor in last year's affair, hoping to use the declaration as a basis for a plea to the International Court at the Hague that Nicaragua be directed to pay reparations for damage done. With this end in view, Figueres has been conducting a good-will tour of most of the Latin American capitals. But the Nicaraguan government, supported by certain other states, notably Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, has been exercising an opposite pressure on the OAS. This division among the Latin Americans themselves puts the State Department in the position of arbiter: from now on, the policies of the OAS, including both its actions and its inaction, will reflect the attitude of the United States.

If further trouble is to be avoided, it is important that action should be taken without delay. New concentrations of forces have been reported on the Nicaraguan border, only this time on the Atlantic coast. Is Nicaragua planning a new aggression? Or is the Nicaraguan game to force Costa Rica to live in a constant state of alert, to weaken its economy by imposing heavy precautionary expenses, and in the long run to stir up discontent which might turn against the Costa Rican regime?

The weak economy of the little republic has already been undermined by the fighting of January 1954, by the decline of coffee prices, and by the sudden suspension of hemp buying. The United States government is the only purchaser of this fiber, which used to be produced for its account in the Philippines. After the latter were occupied by the Japanese, Washington charged United Fruit with the task of growing hemp in Costa Rica. Are the plantations in the neighborhood of Manila again in a position to supply the needs of

the United States government? Or is there some other reason for the suspension of buying in Costa Rica? Whatever the reason, there is no doubt that United Fruit has suddenly stopped the cultivation of hemp in Costa Rica and has fired the workers who were engaged in it. Twelve hundred persons have thus been thrown out of work and deprived of resources—not an inconsiderable number in a country with a total population of scarcely a million. And a new burden has been thrown on the Costa Rican authorities who have been forced to organize food and shelter for the unemployed.

In spite of all difficulties and threats, the Costa Rican leaders are carrying on the struggle with optimism—an optimism founded on confidence in their own powers of resistance, and also on the external supports which helped them to emerge triumphant from their first testing: support of democratic Latin American opinion which increasingly sees in Costa Rica the standard-bearer of Spanish American liberties; and the support of democratic opinion and of the trade unions in the United States, which can be counted on not to fail this little citadel of democracy in the tropics if it again becomes the object of attack.

JAPAN AND CHINA

BY MARY CLABAUGH WRIGHT

As the war between Nationalist and Communist China for control of the Straits of Formosa ebbs and flows, the relation of the little island of Quemoy to the Communist mainland of Asia is becoming a major issue in our Far Eastern policy. But little is said, in the press, of the relation to the mainland of a considerably more important group of islands, namely the four main islands of Japan.

The immediate threat to the Japanese-American alliance is not the danger of outside attack or internal subversion. These remain long-term hazards against which appropriate measures are being

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taken. But at present there is no sign that either Russia or China contemplates an attack on Japan, while internally the Japanese Communist Party is extremely weak and meeting with little popular response. Nor is anti-American feeling in Japan of such proportions or character as to endanger friendly relations. The real and present threat to Japanese-American relations is this: prolonged tension between the United States and Communist China is undermining Japanese confidence in our foreign policy; if we should go to war against China, there is grave doubt as to whether Japan would support us.

U.S. vs. Japanese Interests

Most Americans interested in world affairs are aware that United States policy toward China is the object of considerable criticism in England and Western Europe and in India and Southeast Asia. But Japanese views of our policy are seldom mentioned. We seem to assume that since Japanese interests are so closely tied to ours in many fields, the Japanese conception of security in the Pacific must parallel our own. In fact, on Pacific security Japanese interests as the Japanese conceive them conflict quite sharply with American interests as we conceive them, and nowhere more sharply than on the problem raised by the emergence of Communist China as a major power.

Japanese opinion, like American opinion, is a subtle and complicated phenomenon, but, as in America, there are on some issues deeply rooted and strongly held views shared in varying degree by the country at large. Opinion in a free country—and Japan is a free country—is always somewhat diversified, but the range of Japanese views on China is startlingly different from the range of American views.

There is in Japan today little evidence of fear or even apprehension where Communist China is concerned. On the contrary, the "tone" of opinion is warm and friendly. A great deal is written about China—in newspapers, magazines, and books; but while points of view and intellectual levels vary, the discussion is virtually always couched in sympathetic and cordial language. The language used is not only sympathetic but respectful. Whatever the particular writer's view, he starts from the assumption that Communist China is a major power, here to stay, the leading country of Asia today, eventually, perhaps, of the world. Its politics, its literature and art, its social and economic policies are considered worth close attention because of their intrinsic interest as well as because of their relation to Japan's future.

Admiration of Mao

Chinese Communist leaders figure prominently in the news, where it is taken for granted that they are outstanding statesmen

on the world scene. Certainly differing opinions are published, but in general Japanese appraisals of Mao Tse-tung, for example, range only from unqualified admiration to qualified admiration. The picture drawn and apparently accepted is that of a peasant with the vision to see that China must modernize her economy; of a patriot and nationalist, not a puppet; of a statesman of integrity and skill.

To Japanese with some knowledge of Chinese history—and they figure as largely in the population as do Americans with some knowledge of European history—Mao's ascendancy marks the return to the Chinese political scene of leadership of the traditional high calibre. To them, Mao is the first Chinese political figure worth studying since 1870. To some, although there are more reservations on this point, Mao is also a great thinker who, under the influence of the Chinese heritage, is producing a new kind of Communism infused with the values of the traditional civilization. In more than one university, the writings of Mao are used as elementary texts in the Chinese language on the ground that the students will study these writings more diligently than any others. Japanese translations of American and Nationalist Chinese attacks on Mao are remaindered at three cents and still remain on the stands. One can scarcely give them away. But Mao's own writings sell steadily at prices ranging from fifteen cents to four dollars.

The literature of the Chinese Revolution is enormously influential in Japan today, above all the works of the great Lu-hsun, whom the Chinese Communist Party has canonized. The various cults we have known of European writers do not remotely approach the present Japanese cult of Lu-hsun. His works are read on street cars, buses, and trains, and even a normal school must have a Lu-hsun specialist on its staff. An educated Japanese today can no more confess to an ignorance of Lu-hsun than could an educated American a generation ago admit ignorance of Shakespeare. But the Lu-hsun so idolized is presented not merely as the greatest of modern writers but as the voice of living revolution, and the glory of Lu-hsun becomes the glory of the CCP today.

Hopes for Mainland Trade

While creative literature commands wider attention in Japan than it does in the United States, it does not, of course, interest the whole population. Chinese Communist economic policy, by contrast, is a subject of lively discussion not only in professional and academic circles but in business and labor organizations and party caucuses. Japanese government and business leaders are constantly seeking to enlarge the sphere of Japanese trade with the mainland, and American-sponsored restrictions are the source of perennial friction. The

man in the street is told, and seems to believe, that there would be more jobs with higher wages if Japan could export freely to the mainland again, and more food, clothing, and fuel at lower prices if Japan could once again import freely from the mainland.

Now, it seems likely that even the more cautious and informed business men and trade analysts are exaggerating the benefits to the Japanese economy which free trade with Communist China might bring. The point here is that they do hold these views and hold them strongly—so strongly that leading industrialists collaborate with the Left and supply the funds needed for the steady publication of friendly and optimistic studies of the Chinese Communist economy. Japanese in this state of mind can easily be persuaded that American economic aid, which is as onerous to them as it is to the American taxpayer, represents, as the Communists say, an important interference with the reconstruction of an independent Japanese economy.

The Chinese Economy

While the obvious Japanese yearning for the China trade is widely recognized in the United States, the more complex Japanese admiration for the Chinese Communist economy is less well understood. Chinese Communist production figures and other economic reports are prominently published and taken quite seriously. There is argument over the interpretation of the figures, but the argument is only on the degree of true economic progress. From no quarter does one hear that there has been no true progress at all. And as the Japanese meditate upon the trends which they think they see, and worry over their own seemingly prosperous but obviously unstable and dependent economy, an increasing number of them become receptive to the idea that historic roles have been reversed, that the economic program of Mao's "New Democracy" is the proper model for the development of all Asian economies, including that of Japan. To anyone familiar with Japanese attitudes toward exploitation of the "backward" Chinese economy before 1945, any such shift in attitude will seem incredible. But there is evidence that such a shift is beginning.

Japanese View of Communist Society

Chinese Communist social policy is a subject of less practical interest to the Japanese today than is CCP economic policy, but it seems even more highly charged emotionally. Serious and expensive books on the structure of the traditional Chinese society and its reform find a wide market. Regardless of what view a particular scholar may hold with reference to the problems of sociological analysis involved, he gives the reader the impression that the traditional

society of China was a lovely way of life, an arcadia far superior to the pre-industrial societies of Japan and Europe. This fond feeling is not transferred, however, to the contemporary defenders of Chinese tradition on Formosa; far from it. In the Japanese view, the remnants of traditional Chinese society have been a shambles in the twentieth century, a wreckage from which the CCP is rebuilding a new China worthy of its past, a socialist society as superior to other socialisms as the Confucian society was superior to Japanese or Western feudalism. And as the Chinese Communist experiment progresses, numerous Japanese think they see in it the harmonious resolution of the grave strains with which Japanese society today is taut. Over there on the mainland mobility is believed to be high, opportunity unlimited.

A student in one of Japan's jammed universities both hopes and fears he may be one of the lucky ones to get a job with a corporation at \$20 a month and live out a life of boredom, tortured introspection, and true personal hardship, in the vast lower reaches of the Japanese business bureaucracy; and he often envies his Chinese counterpart who he believes is studying to play a free and active role in the building of a new world. Similarly, the contrast is drawn between Japanese women today, legally emancipated but stranded and bewildered, often terrified at their new freedom, and an image of self-assured, competent, happy Chinese women with a high status in the home and community and real opportunity for dazzling careers in every field.

Resurgent Sinophilism

In short, the picture of Communist China most widely held in Japan today is the picture of a great country, the "big brother," the "good neighbor," who now once again is becoming the pace-setter of the world; a country which is proving that an Asian economy can be developed by its own people without foreign aid; that a free modern society can be built on old foundations; that Asian statesmen can command the respect of the world; that an Asian army can hold the West at bay; that political institutions can be devised which will be responsive to truly popular wishes, rather than weighted on the side of wealth as those of the West and Japan herself are believed to be weighted.

This Japanese picture of Communist China is, of course, not a balanced, accurate, and objective picture. The point here is that it is the dominant picture in Japan today, and it is considerably more than a passing fad, although an element of fad is involved. Unfortunately for us, current Japanese admiration for the mainland is a strange but vigorous growth from deep roots. Apparently the Peking regime is making no great effort to influence Japanese opinion; it does not need agents in a country where several circumstances have

combined to produce a resurgent Sinophilism more potent than anything foreign propaganda could hope to achieve.

The Debt to Chinese Civilization

In the first place, even at the height of conquest, Japan was never able to shake herself free of a sense of obligation to Chinese civilization from which Japan had drawn so heavily in the arts, literature, religion, philosophy, and political theory—from which the very art of writing had come. Japanese history had been marked by alternating periods of exaltation of native Japanese strains and then of re-Sinicization.

During the long years of the attempted conquest of China, the superiority of the pure, uncontaminated Japanese martial spirit had been reiterated *ad nauseam* by the Japanese right-wing military. When that line was discredited—and it is worth noting that in Japan, as contrasted with Germany, that line *was* fully discredited—it is not surprising that there was once again renewed enthusiasm for China. The Allied powers drove home a lesson which the Japanese were ready to learn: that their interference in China had led to the greatest human tragedy in history; that they had injured themselves scarcely less deeply than they had injured China; that it was their solemn responsibility to renounce humbly all past pretensions and to search for ways of living in peace, harmony, and mutual tolerance with their Asian neighbors, and above all with China.

Secondly, postwar Japanese did more than renounce all idea of intervention on the continent. They also diligently studied the sermons of the Allied powers concerning human rights, the general welfare, civil liberties, and economic and social justice. The view grew that as Japan's tragedy had been born of neglect of these values, so Japan's future rested with their earnest cultivation.

As far as China was concerned, the new world outlook of the Japanese posed a dilemma in the years immediately following the end of the war. The Japanese were convinced that the Chinese heritage must be respected, but few traces of the Chinese heritage could be found in the unprincipled chaos of expediency which characterized postwar Nationalist China. The Japanese were further convinced that modern liberal values must be the basis of a new world, but there were few signs of modern liberal values in the China of Chiang Kai-shek. And so Japanese columnists wrote friendly news stories whenever they could, avoided saying anything which might seem "anti-Chinese," and tried to put a good face on everything, evidently feeling that if the mainland was a dispiriting wreck, part of the responsibility lay with Japan. But the effort was forced and there was no heart in it.

Japan Watches Chinese Progress

With the rise to power of the Chinese Communists, the situation changed rapidly. Where previously the Japanese had been trying to work up enthusiasm for Nationalist China without great success, there now was a new China which readily captured their imaginations. As the Japanese saw it, here was a Chinese government which clearly had more popular support than any Chinese government within living memory. Here was a Chinese government whose program seemed to call for the creation of a progressive modern state and society, yet one which was adjusted to special Chinese conditions. Here was a government which had the support of China's greatest novelists, poets, playwrights, scientists, economists, historians—a government which had expelled the “warlords,” the “corrupt financiers,” the glib talkers, and pushed scholars and peasants into high position. Surely it was Communist, but so what? As the Japanese saw it, their own discredited past military leaders had shrieked to them of the dangers of the world Communist conspiracy, and by listening to those leaders they had plunged the world into a holocaust. For that they accepted the responsibility, and they were not going to be caught again with shibboleths about saving Asia from Communism. They had renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and they meant it.

To the Japanese it seemed that the accession of the Communists made it possible for them to admire China as wholeheartedly as they wanted to, to salute both China's past and China's future, and to renounce the past of their relations with the mainland without prejudice to the future. The prospect of a unified China seemed to mean the end of generations of civil wars in which too many Japanese lives had been lost. The prospect of a government with a sound economic program encouraged the dream of expanding production and expanding trade for all East Asia—a Greater East Asia in which China, not Japan, was dominant. Here was a government which was even eliminating those blemishes on Chinese civilization which had always irritated the Japanese. For the Communists were cleaning up China. The sewers were being drained, the rats and flies disappearing, thievery, beggary, squeeze, and corruption virtually gone! Every month, new Japanese repatriates told the same story and bore out the claims heard in Japan every afternoon over Radio Peking and reproduced in the following day's newspaper.

America's China Policy

In the normal course of events, this rosy Japanese picture of Communist China would doubtless have been gradually modified. There is in Japan—among scholars, journalists, popular writers, officials, and businessmen—a larger stock of sound, fundamental knowl-

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edge about modern China than in all the rest of the non-Chinese world combined. The best of the Japanese scholars combine a life-long intimacy with Chinese culture with a thorough training in the modern social science methods. They have today freedom of opinion and expression, and they treasure it.

But events did not run a normal course. And as hostility between the United States and Communist China mounts, the flaws the Japanese believe they see in American policy loom far larger than any imperfections in China. They argue that we protracted the Chinese civil war, heightened its violence, and pushed the Chinese Communists into a more bellicose frame of mind. The Japanese want no more war on anybody's side for anybody's purposes, least of all against mainland China. They are not interested in calculating who will come to whose defense if war does break out, for the simple reason that they anticipate obliteration. The only security schemes which really interest them are those which seem to them likely to lessen the chances of war. They are strong supporters of the UN. Most of them can be persuaded with some reluctance to support enough of a defense force to discourage casual adventurism against Japan. They are afraid of a large defense force not only because their history makes them suspicious of the political role of the military but also because they consider that a larger force might be considered provocative by Russia and China and could in no case even delay the annihilation of Japan if war broke out.

Explanations of America's China policy fall on deaf ears in Japan today. They know our case, for the Japanese press provides quite good coverage of American politics, and we have an active information program. But the American line on China, as the Japanese call it, has not only not been persuasive; it has proved to be a boomerang.

You are all too anxious to awake us and start us on a new road, and you will do it; but you will all regret it, for, once awaking and started, we shall go fast and far—farther than you think—much farther than you want.

—Premier Wen Hsiang to a British representative, 1860 or 1870, in Hart, *These from the Land of Sinim*, London, 1901.

"The industrial revolution" of the 19th century has for its inevitable result the social revolution of the 20th century.

—Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1900

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

A NEW START AT BANDUNG

The Bandung Conference brought the world face to face with a new force—a gathering representing more than half of the human family, living in 29 Asian-African nations, most of which were colonies or dependencies as lately as 1945. That so impressive a grouping could be brought together so soon after these nations had won their independence is the most impressive aspect of Bandung.

Equally significant was the absence from Bandung of representatives from Britain, France, Germany, and Holland, the four Western powers which dominated extensive areas of Asia-Africa in 1914. Forty years ago, economic and political decisions controlling the lives of Asians and Africans were made chiefly in London, Paris, Berlin, and The Hague. The Asian-African policymakers who conferred at Bandung in April, 1955, were piloting their own ships of state on the stormy seas of the international power struggle.

Noisy voices of discord were heard in Bandung. Spokesmen for the governments of the Philippines and Iraq, who made it clear that they were still wearing collars made in Washington, did their best to split the conference with the red herring of anti-Communism. They failed. The measure of their failure was the unanimity with which the conferees, in their final resolutions, declared for an end of colonialism, for human rights and self-determination, for disarmament, including the banning of nuclear weapons, and for "settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations."

The Conference affirmed its "full support of the fundamental principles of human rights" as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Applying these principles to the problems of dependent peoples, the Conference agreed:

1. In declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;
2. In affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien sub-

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jugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;

3. In declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples; and

4. In calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

The final communique of the Asian-African parley, covering more than a half a page of newsprint, presented an impressive and statesman-like plea for ending colonialism, abolishing war, and establishing peace and cooperation among the nations and peoples who make up the human family.

Five nations called the Asian-African parley—Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Twenty-four other nations, responding to the call, sent delegations to Bandung—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Peoples Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of [North] Viet Nam, State of Viet Nam, and Yemen.

Offer—

Toward the end of the Bandung parley, there was an informal interchange between Peking and Washington concerning the Formosa crisis. As Washington and Peking are not on diplomatic speaking terms, the exchange took the form of public declarations.

After a luncheon on Saturday, April 23—attended by the prime ministers of China, Indonesia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, and Burma, the foreign minister of Thailand, and the chief of the Philippine delegation—Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of China, made a statement to correspondents:

The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States of America. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan [Formosa] area.

Here was a simple, direct offer from the chief spokesman of Asia to negotiate the issues which separate China and Asia on one side and the United States and the West on the other.

The Chinese offer caused a sensation at the conference. Asian and European diplomatic circles hailed it as a way out of the threatening Formosan dispute. Delegate after delegate at Bandung backed up Chou. Bandung and the world waited for Washington's reply.

—And Refusal

Washington replied quickly and typically:

The Department of State has received press reports concerning the statement of Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference. The United States always welcomes any efforts, if sincere, to bring peace to the world.

In the Formosa region we have an ally in the Free Republic of China, and of course the United States would insist on Free China participating as an equal in any discussions concerning the area.

If Communist China is sincere, there are a number of obvious steps it can take to clear the air considerably and give evidence before the world of its good intentions. One of these would be to place in effect in the area an immediate cease fire. It could also immediately release the American airmen and others whom it unjustly holds. Another could be the acceptance of the outstanding invitation by the Security Council of the United Nations to participate in discussions to end hostilities in the Formosa region.

The first paragraph of the State Department's reply contained a slur (a reference to "Chou En-lai" without any recognition of the fact that he is Premier and Foreign Minister of the Chinese Peoples Republic, or that his offer came out of a conference attended by top spokesmen of some of the most important countries of Asia), and an insult (in the phrase "if sincere").

The second paragraph, demanding that Chiang's government participate as an equal in the proposed bilateral conference, was an effective refusal to negotiate, since Chiang had repeatedly asserted that he would not participate in any conference with representatives of the Peking government.

The third paragraph was an ultimatum: If you want to talk with us, first abandon your position on three important issues which are to come up for discussion.

Chou and his Asian backers had made an offer to negotiate, seemingly in good faith. Washington questioned the good faith, refused to negotiate, and took the position: We are in the right; our hands are clean. You are in the wrong; and besides, your hands are dirty. Most important of all, Washington sent this reply without consulting its allies and supporters in Europe or Asia—a typical example of Washington's arrogant unilateralism.

Washington's Somersault

The Secretary of State was on vacation when the Chou offer was made. Washington's reply seems to have been drafted by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., with the approval of Presi-

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dent Eisenhower. It was issued immediately, on Saturday, according to press reports, "because Washington did not want Peiping to hold the diplomatic initiative over the week-end."

Washington's reply to the Chou offer met with a bad reception from Asians and Europeans. It aroused a storm of criticism even in the United States.

Two days after Washington had "shot from the hip" at Chou, Secretary Dulles was back in his office trying to mend the battered fences. On Tuesday, April 26, he held a press conference, reported in full in the *New York Times*. At the outset Dulles read a brief statement which included this reference to Bandung and the Chou offer:

The Bandung conference, as we had hoped, seems to have exerted a restraint on the Chinese Communists. I have always felt that it would be salutary if the Chinese Communists were confronted with the opinions of the free nations of Asia. The opinion was powerfully expressed in favor of peace and against direct and indirect aggression. . . .

The Chinese Communists found no backing for their announced program of seizing Taiwan [Formosa] by force. On the contrary, they felt it useful in the last hours of the Bandung conference to propose to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Whether or not that was a sincere proposal remains to be seen. Perhaps the Chinese Communists were merely playing a propaganda game. But we intend to try to find out. In doing so we shall not, of course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward our ally, the Republic of China.

Throughout the press conference, Secretary Dulles was on the defensive. He admitted that he had not seen the State Department answer to Chou before it was issued; argued, lawyer fashion, that the refusal to meet Chou without the participation of Chiang's representatives did not refer to the cease fire but only to matters concerning "the rights of the Chinese Nationalists and their claims." Under all the circumstances, Dulles agreed that the State Department should take the Chou offer seriously and reply to it. "A proposal has been made which may or may not be sincere." The proposal was made "in the presence of a very large group of countries, made to them first privately and then it was made publicly." "We believe that the circumstances under which it was made are apt to give it a greater degree of credibility than perhaps if it had been made under other circumstances." In a word, considerations of respectability and domestic and foreign pressures had compelled Washington, on Tuesday, to reverse the stand it had taken the previous Saturday.

The *New York Times* of April 27 headlined the Dulles press conference: "DULLES IS WILLING TO TALK TO PEIPING ON CEASE

FIRE WITHOUT NATIONALISTS. U. S. ALTERS STAND." Ernest O. Hauser had an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of April 30, 1955, captioned: "WHY BRITAIN THINKS WE DON'T KNOW WHAT WE'RE DOING."

MORE ABOUT THE GAP

Arno H. Johnson, Vice President of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, is greatly concerned about "The Gap" between productive capacity and consumer spending in the United States. He believes that businessmen must sell an additional \$40 billions in goods and services during 1955-1956 in order to provide for the orderly expansion of the United States economy. (*New York Times*, April 23, 1955, p. 25.)

Johnson, who was speaking before the Convention of the American Association of Advertising Agencies, explained:

We need this higher level of consumption just to keep up our productivity and growing labor force.

We need it to support a total production large enough to provide the revenue both for a balanced budget and a continued strong defense.

We need it to advance the standard of living of our American population to a level more nearly in line with our capacity.

This big expansion in consumer spending from \$234 billion in 1954-1955 to \$274 billion in 1955-1956 is only a beginning, Mr. Johnson insisted. Assuming, with the President's Board of Economic Advisers, that total production will rise from the present \$360-billion level to \$500 billion by 1965, Johnson believes that consumer spending will advance from its present \$234-billion level to a minimum of at least \$350 billion in 1965.

Consumer savings at present are at a \$20-billion annual rate. If United States consumers are to spend an additional \$40 billion during the coming year, they must increase their income by that amount or else they must forego current savings and perhaps eat into their savings backlogs.

However, it must be remembered that the current consumer spending of \$234 billion annually has been accompanied by a rapid rise in installment credit and in mortgages on homes, with some time payments running for as much as 30 years and more. How will these consumers, whose incomes are already pledged to the limit, be able to take on additional installment obligations?

Business economists are warning of the inflationary dangers inherent in the present rapid mushrooming of the United States debt

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structure. Does Mr. Johnson contemplate adding another story to this house of cards?

Credit booms have boomed time and again. They have also collapsed, or else they have led into dangerous inflations. In all economic history, there has never been an indefinite up-and-up such as President Eisenhower assumes when he says, "Our economy must continue to expand." Barring an economic miracle, the current United States boom in public and private credit—notes, bonds, mortgages, paper currency, and other IOUs, with a total volume of well over \$600 billion—will end in a collapse, a disastrous inflation, or both. There is a principle in sociology as well as in physics that action and reaction tend to be equal and opposite.

As part of their current peace offensive, the Soviets are once again professing their belief in the peaceful "coexistence" of Communist and capitalist states. It is natural that this should be greeted with sniffs of suspicion in the U. S. and the West, but there is some danger that suspicion of the source may lead to rejection of the principle. . . .

The danger is that by dint of constant demonstration of Soviet perfidy the U. S. may gradually—and perhaps subconsciously—be abandoning belief in the possibility of coexistence. While continuing to pay it lip-service, the U. S. may in fact be constructing effective policy on other and contrary bases. More and more, attacks are being made on the very concept of coexistence. . . .

What the principle of coexistence does require the West to accept is the premise that the Soviet empire and the free nations can continue to occupy the same planet without being irresistibly impelled to mutual annihilation. Neither the specific case of Czechoslovakia nor the degeneration of East-West relations generally disproves the principle. But for it to work, it is necessary in the first instance that both East and West accept it.

. . . The almost exclusive emphasis its [U. S.] policy now puts on military might and the danger of war could all too easily lead both policy-makers and people generally to the conviction that war is inevitable.

That would be not only to repudiate coexistence; it would be to deny the validity of the Western way of life. It would be to assume that that way of life can triumph over Soviet totalitarianism only by force of arms and not by virtue of its intrinsic superiority. In short, the denial of the principle of coexistence is the ultimate in defeatism.

—Wall Street Journal, August 17, 1951

(continued from inside front cover)

now is: are we justified in hoping that the worst is over and that a more favorable period may be opening? It seemed to be the general consensus of speakers and guests at the birthday party that there are good, even if still far from decisive, reasons to think that this may be the case. Let us hope so, and let us lose no time about putting the matter to the test. As the general atmosphere improves, we expect MR's circulation to go up and the sale of MR literature to expand; and we count on you, our readers, to see that these things happen. How long is it since you, personally, sent in a new sub? When did you last check to see if all MR books and pamphlets are in your own and your friends' libraries? How about it? Are things better?

As we go to press, there is no further word about the date of the hearing of the appeal in the Swezy case by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Meanwhile, however, the case continues to make news abroad. We have just received a copy of a protest statement on the case sponsored by the Japanese Historical Science Society and signed by *more than four hundred persons*. The covering letter says: "Would you please remember that an academic society of historiography, which has largest membership in Japan, supports your resistance against American fascism, wishing heartily your perfect victory, and how many historians in Japan express publicly their wills of resistance for you." Indeed we shall remember, and we reciprocate by sending our heartfelt thanks and greetings to our Japanese colleagues.

Almost every mail brings further news of greatest interest about Japan. One item which we would like to share with MR readers is that the Youth and Women's Department of the Osaka District Conference of the All-Japan Accident Insurance Employees Union has officially taken up the task of translating Leo Huberman's *The Truth About Unions* into Japanese. A study group of some 30 members from ten locals has been formed and meets weekly to study and translate the book. This is but one example of a kind of activity which is extremely widespread in Japan and which is described by one of our correspondents in the following words:

Many labor organizations are conducting "Study and Learning" campaigns, under the influence of the Chinese example. . . . These workers' study circles have branched off into literary, theatrical, and musical ventures, coming up with some very wonderful results. There is a huge nation-wide movement among workers, peasants, students—youth in general—called the "Singing Voices" movement. A motto of the movement is that "Singing Voices Are a Force for Peace." Many old folk dances and songs of Japan have been revived and many new ones created in the course of the movement's development.

For further evidence of the importance of the Chinese example in Japan today, readers are referred to Professor Mary Wright's extremely interesting article on "China and Japan" in this month's MR.

As we go to press, Cedric Belfrage, editor of the *National Guardian*, is once again in jail, victim of a vindictive deportation campaign which ought to be recognized by all publishers, editors, and writers for what it is, a serious threat to the freedom of the press. We think it is high time for some of those representatives of the press who have been talking fair words about the need for freedom to *do* something about it—and we can think of no better place to start than the Belfrage case.

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